Wednesday, October 14, 2015

Georgians in Afghanistan, 1709-1711

Georgian involvement in Afghanistan began in the 16th–17th centuries when they became integrated en masse in the Persian army and participated in the Safavid campaigns in Afghanistan. At the start of the 18th century Shah Sultan Husayn gradually lost his grip on the political situation in Afghanistan, where he faced both local insurgency and growing interests from the Moghul India. To address this situation, Sultan Husayn turned to his Georgian allies: King of Kartli Giorgi XI (Gurjin-Khan/Gorgin Khan), who served as the governor (beglarbegi) of Kirman, his brother Levan (Šāhqoli Khan) , the chief justice (divan-begi) of Persia, and his nephew Kaikhosro (Kay-Ḵosrow Khan / Khusrau-Khan) as the prefect of police (darugha) of Isfahan. 

The Georgian commanders successfully campaigned in 1700, driving the Afghani tribesmen out of the eastern Persian provinces. In 1703, Gurjin-Khan, now commander-in-chief (sipah-salar) of the Persian army was given the task of delivering Qandahar and subduing the Afghans. He led his corps of some 4,000 Georgians and 20,000 Persians in May 1704 and quickly subjugated the country. However, his soldiers proved to be unforgiving toward the local population, sequestered goods, and raised taxes. Georgian heavy handed treatment of the Afghan population prompted Mir Vays (Mir Weis/Mir Ways), a leader of the Hotaki Ghilzay tribe, to lead a rebellion, but he was quickly arrested by the Georgians. Gurjin-Khan then committed the crucial mistake of sending Mir Vays to Isfahan, although he urged the shah to get rid of him or at least never to allow him to return to Qandahar. A Persian faction hostile to the Georgians existed in the Persian capital, and it took advantage of Mir Vays’ accounts to paint the Georgian actions in the worst possible light. According to a contemporary Ottoman report (preserved at the Glasgow University's Hunter Collection), prepared by Joseph the Georgian who accompanied a French embassy to the Safavid court, the chief vizier and the chief eunuch, both hearty enemies of the Georgians, helped Mir Vays to lull the suspicions of the shah, who ordered Gurjin-Khan to show moderation and cooperate with the Afghans. The Ghilzay leader was set free, and sent to Kandahar to watch Gurghin Khan 

Gurjin-Khan clearly underestimated the danger he was facing since he failed to notice Mir Vays’ schemes. According to Joseph's account, In 1709, one of the Afghan tribes refused to pay taxes. Mir Vays urged the Khan to subdue them at once and thus got the Georgian soldiers out of the way. He then invites Gurjin-Khan to his estate outside Kandahar in order to receive the submission and gifts of two recalcitrant but now penitent beys. Gurjin-Khan fell into the trap, and in the banquet that followed he was slain with all his retinue. Mir Vays then put on Gurjin-Khan' uniform and had his men do the same. Thus disguised, and moving in, what Joseph describes as, "Georgian formation" they appeared at sunset before the citadel of Kandahar. The Georgian garrison, thinking their compatriots were returning, opened the gates to let them in. They were cut to pieces and the place taken. The inhabitants were warned to stay within doors until morning.  

Upon their return the Georgians troops, who had been sent to subdue a rebellious tribe, found Kandahar in the Afghan hands. They commenced a fighting retreat that was later described by Jonas Hanway, an English merchant who traveled to Persia in 1740s, stayed at the court of Nadir Shah and published an interesting travelogue that recounted his experiences as well as stories he had heard during his voyage. Among these stories was the account of the Georgian retreat from Kandahar:

"Three days had elapsed since the governor's [Gurjin-Khan] death, when the sentinels descried from the ramparts a considerable body of cavalry; this was the detachment of Georgians, who, ignorant of what had passed, were coming to the city, loaded with the spoils of the rebels. As their return was expected, proper orders were given for their reception; they were suffered [allowed] to advance within musket-shot, when the cannon of the town was discharged at them so that they immediately conjectured that the place had changed masters. Mir Vays thought this a good opportunity for establishing the reputation of his arms; he accordingly marched out at the head of five or six thousand horse, intending to cut off the retreat of the Georgians; but he soon perceived, that he had to do with troops better disciplined, and more inured to war, than his Afghans.

The Georgians, quitting their booty, forced their way sword in hand, and passed the defile of Zebil. After fighting their way through the country for the space of eight days, with an amazing intrepidity, they marched out of the province. What the Georgians suffered in this retreat, as well through want of provisions and forage, as the frequent attacks of their enemies, is hardly credible; but their courage was invincible. The Afghans made five different attacks upon them in one day, and notwithstanding the great superiority of their numbers, they were always repulsed; insomuch that they lost above two thousand men in these different engagements. 

As an instance of the resolution of the Georgians, it is related, that they swam their horses over a considerable river, within three leagues of the defile of Zebil, on the side of Kandahar: one of them [Georgians], who was dismounted seeing an Afghan riding towards him in full speed, turned back to meet him, and holding out to him, with one hand, his sabre, as if he intended to surrender, with the other, he shot him through the head, with a pistol, then leaping upon the dead man's horse, he plunged into the river, which he crossed under the incessant fire of the enemy, who were amazed at his resolution. 

All the advantage that Mir Vays reaped from this expedition was the making himself master of the defile of Zebil. This [pass] is on the side of Persia, as that of Kabul is towards India, and these are the only passes through the mountains with which the province of Kandahar is surrounded. The Afghan chief, who had now so lately experienced that valour alone is not sufficient in carrying on a war, left troops to guard these narrow passes, and applied himself to discipline his men, and also to gain the other towns of the province; in hopes, that by their means, together with the alliances which he intended to conclude With his neighbours, he should be able to withstand the forces that might be sent against him.

After learning about this disaster, Shah Sultan Husayn dispatched Kaikhosro, who succeeded Gurjin Khan as the king of Kartli, with 30,000 Persians and 1,200 Georgians to suppress the uprising in November 1709. However, this expedition was suffered from food shortages and low morale among the Persian (qezelbāš/qizilbash) troops, as well as from intrigues of the Persian grand vizier who sought to weaken the Georgian faction. Kaikhosro initially defeated the Afghan detachments and besieged Kandahar, which resisted for five months. This gave Mir Vays sufficient time to rally tribes, gather reinforcements and counterattack. The excerpt below is from Judasz Tadeusz Krusinski, missionary and Procurator of the Jesuits at Ispahan, who lived in Persia from 1704 to 1729. An acute observer and a good judge of contemporary events, he published History of the Late Revolutions of Persia, an important source on the history of the early 18th century Iran.  

[As the Georgian/Persian siege of Kandahar failed] Mir Weis [Mir Vays] who had only waited for this Moment, immediately took the Field at the Head of a great Body of Troops, all fresh Men, who having an Enemy [Georgians and Persians] to oppose that was already fatigued by Heat, and weakened by Poverty [lack of supplies], went to the Battle as to a certain Victory, of which they could not fail. 

Being mounted upon fresh Horses, and having no other Incumbrance but their Arms, they were soon up with the Rear-Guard of the Enemy's [Persian] Army. At first they only harassed it by a few Skirmishes, to give Time for the Arrival of a Reinforcement that Mir-Weis expected, which could not march so fast as the Horse, viz. a Body of eight hundred Camels, which carried two Soldiers each, Back to Back, armed with great Carbines. This Reinforcement was no sooner arrived, but they fell on all Sides upon the [Georgian] Rear Guard, which was all cut in Pieces, with the General [Georgian prince Kaikhosro who was killed]. Mir-Weis immediately after this first Expedition, went and fell upon the Persian troops that were retiring with the less Apprehension or Precaution, because they thought themselves secured by the Rear-Guard, of whose Defeat they were not informed. He made a bloody Slaughter of them, and carried away all their Baggage. One would have imagined, that Mir-Weis would have thought two Victories enough for the Work of one Day; however, he did not stop there, but resolved to attack the Body of the Georgian Army, which was marching homewards the other Way. But he was checked in his Progress, by a Troop of five hundred Georgians, who, though surrounded on all Sides, defended themselves with so much Resolution and Courage, that they cut their Way through the Enemy Sword in Hand, and went and joined the Body of their Army, which perhaps would have been surprised in their March, and defeated as well as their Rear-Guard, had it not been for this timely Intelligence. 

The Resistance which Mir-Weis met with from those five hundred Georgians made him give over the Thoughts of pursuing the main Body of an Army consisting of such good Troops, and he returned with his Afghans laden with Booty, to Kandahar being followed into the Town with all the Baggage of the Enemy's Army; and though they had been twice victorious, they could not help doing Justice, even at their own Expense, to the Bravery of the Georgians, saying that the Persians were but women compared to the Afghans and the Afghans but women compared with the Georgians.

The defeat of the Georgian/Persian expeditionary force allowed Mir Vays to free all of southern Afghanistan from Safavid control, thus establishing the basis of a state which would extend westwards into the heart of Persia in 1722.

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